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Latzer: Criminal Procedure Decisions

NEW YORK vs. "THE REST OF THE COUNTY":
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Barry Latzer'

ProfessorBarry Latzer:
Thank you Judge. My name is Barry Latzer. I am a professor
at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. My topic is State
Constitutional Criminal Procedure Law in New York and how
New York differs from the rest of the country.
As most of you know, the New York Court of Appeals has
come under rather sharp attack because of its criminal procedure
decisions. Governor Pataki has sharply criticized the court for
being insensitive to crime victims, and to the police and their

I Barry Latzer is Professor of Government at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He
received a J.D. from Fordham University (1985), and a Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (1977). Professor
Latzer wrote STATE CONSTrUTIONAL CRmINAL LAW (1995), STATE
CONsTrrmONs AND CRnINAL JUSTICE (1991), and DEATH PENALTY CASES
(1998). He prepares an ongoing series of articles for the CRIMINAL LAW
BULLETIN, entitled STATE CONsTrrTUTIONAL DEvELopMENTs.
I See Vincent Martin Bonventre & Judi A. DeMarco, Court of Appeals
Bashing:A Reality Check, 69 N.Y. St. B.J. 10, July-Aug., (1997). Governor
Pataki, along with New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco, has sharply
criticized the court of appeals as being too lenient on criminals. Id. Attorney
General Vacco "decried the 'arcane technicalities and liberal interpretations'
that have interfered with police work 'at a time when innocent, young children
are being killed and maimed.'" Id. "Governor Pataki protested the current
'imbalance' created by the Court of Appeals that 'tips the scales in favor of
criminal rights.'" See also Sarah Metzgar, Patai Proposes Empowering
Police in Evidence Cases, TsS UNION, Jan. 30, 1996, at Al. The New
York City Police Commissioner "ridiculed the screwball Court of Appeals for
living off in Disneyland somewhere"; John Goshko, Accusations of Coddling
Criminals Aimed at Two Judges in Nev York, WAsHINGTON POST, Mar. 14,

1996 at A3.
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needs.3 He has also said that the court of appeals has
"developed a network of law that is very different from the rest
of the country." 4 He was referring to criminal procedure law. 5
Professor Bonventre, 6 for whom I am the designated speaker,
conducted a study to test the proposition that New York was
different from the rest of the country in the area of criminal
procedure.7 He concluded that it was not so.8 Professor

Bonventre tested the proposition by looking at the actual criminal
appeal dispositions by the highest courts in New York and other
northeastern states, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. He looked at these dispositions over a
six-year period, then counted to see which dispositions were
favorable to the defendants and which were favorable to the
prosecution. He concluded that New York was roughly in the
mainstream. 9 New York was not as favorable to the prosecution

I Bonventre & DeMarco, supra note 2, at 10. Governor Pataki has stated
that the court of appeals was going "way too far in putting the rights of the
defendant to hide behind particular technicalities ahead of the rights of the
people to walk the streets, go to school and live safely at home." Id.
I Id. Governor Pataki verbally abused the Court of Appeals at a news
conference in November 1995, where he "berated" the court for its
"'irrational, mindless procedural safeguards' for criminals." Id. Governor
Pataki also stated that "'[tihe other 49 states have a common-sense system of
justice.' He accused the Court of Appeals of "'creating their own rules' and
thereby developing a 'network of law' that is 'very different from the rest of
the country.'" Id.
5

Id.

6 Vincent

M. Bonventre is a Professor of Law at Albany Law School. He
was scheduled to participate in this conference, but was unable to attend.
7 Bonventre & DeMarco, supra note 2, at 10.
I Id. A study of the decisions in criminal cases of the New York Court of
Appeals as well as the high courts of five of New York's neighboring states
"revealed that the decisional output of the New York tribunal is not at all 'very
different from the rest of the country.'"
Id. "More specifically, a
comparative look at criminal appeal dispositions by the high courts of New
York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania
for the six year period from 1990 through 1995 shows that the New York court
is fairly middle of the road." Id.
I Id. Every decision rendered between the years 1990 and 1995 in an appeal
from a criminal prosecution was considered, and in the case of New York,
there were a total of 604 appeals counted. Id. Out of those decisions, the
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as Vermont and not as favorable to defendants as New Jersey, but
fell somewhere in the middle."0 Therefore, these findings
partially rebutted the allegation that New York was out of the
mainstream in relation to state constitutional criminal procedure
decisions.
Professor Bonventre supported his findings with additional
studies of actual doctrinal decisions of the courts. Specifically,
he looked at the actual substance of their rulings. Again, he
compared New York to the same five states." Once again, he
found that those states had rejected Supreme Court decisions and
broadened the state constitutional rights almost to the same extent
that New York had.' 2 He concluded that New York was not
different from the mainstream. 3 I have two criticisms of
Professor Bonventre's approach and will draw a slightly different
conclusion.
In relation to the counting of dispositions, Norman Olch,"4 a
colleague of mine at John Jay College, also conducted a study.
Professor Olch employed a similar technique, but he confined his
study to one year. 5 However, he did not compare New York to
other states. 6
New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the prosecution 61.5 percent of
the10time, which placed it firmly within the six-court spectrum Id.
Id. New York's 61.5 percent pro-prosecution record is almost the average
of Vermont's high of 72 percent and New Jersey's low of 55 percent. Id.
"The New York tribunal shares the middle ground among the six state courts
with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court - albeit the somewhat less proprosecution side of that middle." Id. There is no indication from this study
that the New York Court of Appeals is exceptionally pro-defendant. Id.
u Bonventre & DeMarco, supra note 2, at 9.
12 Bonventre & DeMarco, supra note 2, at 10; see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
13Bonventre & DeMarco, supra note 2, at 11; see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
11 Norman Qlch is a Professor of Law at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice. He wrote an article in the New York Law Journal entitled Soft on
Crime? Not the New York Court of Appeals. N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1996, at 1.
15Id. Professor Olch's study shows that from the period of December 1,
1994 through November 30, 1995, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
prosecution in 75.6 percent of its criminal cases. Id. According to Olch, this
is strongly pro-prosecution. Id. Olch stated that "no one would call the
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There is a problem with counting dispositions. I am not saying
that it does not yield a fruitful result at all, but there could be
many reasons for a disposition in a case. A disposition may not
only have to do with the substantive rights that are involved.
Furthermore, not all cases are equal. Some cases are much more
important than others.
Some cases make major doctrinal
decisions that influence law in the state, both broadly and for
many years to come.17 Some cases are relatively minor; they do
make significant new law. Rather, they are merely clarification
cases, clarifying already-existing law. Therefore, by counting
cases, you start with an assumption that all cases are created
equal. However, they are not. So even though the doctrinal
approach is also subject to criticism - it requires interpretation,
which injects subjective elements into one's analysis the doctrinal
approach is to be preferred.

I criticize Professor Bonventre for studying only the
northeastern states. Many of these states are just as liberal and as
rights expansive as New York. Accordingly, to say New York is
current United States Supreme Court a coddler of criminals, yet defendants are
far better there." Id. "In the combined total of criminal appeals decided by
the Supreme Court in the two term period ending June 1995, defendants
prevailed 35 percent of the time, a considerably higher success rate than 25
percent at New York's high tribunal. Id. Thus, "[a] court which hand
victories to 1 percent of all who seek access to the court can hardly be
described as 'criminal friendly.'" Id.
16 Bonventre & DeMarco, supra note 2, at 12. Olch's studies "shed no light
on whether the Court of Appeals' record of 'protecting the guilty' is out of
line with that of other state supreme courts--either because of the frequency
with which New York's high court sides with criminal defendants or because
its position on the issues are 'very different.'" Id.
'" See Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History Of
Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 1966-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2049, 2120 (1993). "That the content of state supreme court dockets and the
doctrinal direction of decisions varied significantly from one state to another is
indicated by the standard scholarly study of historic change in the business of
these courts to 1970." Id. "Obviously there can be major shifts in direction,
in important areas of constitutional law and common law, when the
composition and ideological coloration of a court change abruptly." Id. See
also Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution,"
74 JuDIcATURE 190 (1991).
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no more liberal and rights expansive than New Jersey or
Connecticut is not saying very much. The better approach is to
compare New York's output in state constitutional criminal
procedure to the output of all the other states. I tried to do this.
I selected the cases in which the New York Court of Appeals
broadened rights on state constitutional grounds. That means that
the state rejected the narrower rights position of the United States
Supreme Court. Then, I examined these same issues in the other
states that reached the state constitutional question.
For example, the first issue on the chart (reproduced below)
here is the good faith exception 8 In Unites States v. Leon,1 9 the
United States Supreme Court established a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule where police rely in reasonable good faith
upon a search warrant which later proves defective. The
evidence seized pursuant to the invalid warrant is not to be
excluded, but rather is to be admitted. The good faith doctrine is
presumably based on the Fourth Amendment.20
In preparing my treatise, I analyzed the criminal procedure
output of all fifty states on the state constitutional provisions.2 '
What I found was a deep division among the state courts on state
constitutional grounds in relation to this good faith rule, the Leon
rule. ' You have to keep in mind that a number of states have
never reached the state constitutional issue on this. Presumably,
they follow the United States Supreme Court's rule on federal
,8
See U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The good faith exception rule
comes into effect when the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is modified to
permit admission of evidence that "was seized in reasonable, good faith
reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective." Id. at
905.
19 Id.

20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution states in pertinent part: "l'Nlo Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id. I say
"presumably," because the Supreme Court created some doubt when it
declared that the exclusionary rule is but a "judicially created remedy," and
not a Fourth Amendment right. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
21 BARRY LATZER,STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (1995).
DId. §§ 2:11-2:13.
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Fourth Amendment grounds. That is, they have a good faith rule
in that state, but the basis for that rule is the federal Fourth
Amendment.2 When a state is in this posture, it means that the
state court may at some point change its mind. A state court may
later claim that it had a good faith rule, but that was because it
was following the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates the
exclusionary rule along with its good faith exception. Therefore,
the state court may claim that it was simply enunciating federal
constitutional law; however, that does not prevent the state from
reconsidering the issue as a state constitutional matter.
To determine whether, as Governor Pataki says, New York is
out of touch or out of the mainstream, one might fairly take into
account all of the states that have not reached the state
constitutional issue. 24 I did not do this in this study, but it seems
to me one could take that position. In other words, one could add
up all of the state courts that follow the Leon rule on the basis of
the Fourth Amendment. One could then add to that list all of the
state courts that follow the Leon rule on the basis of their state
search and seizure provisions. Then, one must look at all of the
state courts, including New York, which reject the Leon rule
based upon the state constitution.
The problem with this methodology is that it gives too mush
weight to state decisions which merely follow the mandate of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If a state constitutional issue is not
raised then the state court may not reach it and must therefore
decide the case on the federal issue that was raised. As the state
court must, in this situation, follow the dictates of the United
States Supreme Court, its decision is not necessarily an
endorsement of the Supreme Court doctrine.
Therefore, in determining whether or not New York is out of
touch with the rest of the country, I have examined only state
constitutional law decisions. These are a truer indicator of the
positions of the state courts. If one finds that there are deep
2 Id. (stating that for a "search warrant, to be valid, [it] must be supported
by an affidavit establishing probable cause."). The court did not mention any
state constitutional provisions in its decision. Id.
24 id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/8

6

1998

Latzer: Criminal Procedure Decisions

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DECISIONS

699

divisions among the other states on state constitutional grounds in
relation to an issue, an issue that New York decided contrary to
the United States Supreme Court's rule, one must conclude that
New York is not out of touch on that issue. New York is simply
reflecting the deep division among the state courts on this issue.
However, if one finds that when other states reached the state
constitutional question, they adopted the Supreme Court's
rationale, then there is a good argument to be made that at least
as to that issue, New York is out of the mainstream.
The Table below presents cases on sixteen criminal procedure
issues, including search and seizure, Miranda, and right to
counsel issues. For each issue, the New York Court of Appeals
has rejected the federal approach, basing its decision upon the
Constitution of the State of New York. The Table also indicates
which states have disagreed with New York, and have adopted
the position of the United States Supreme Court on state
constitutional grounds, and which states have, like New York,
repudiated the federal rule on state grounds.
We should not forget that even though the state has the
prerogative to interpret its state constitutional provisions more
broadly then their federal constitutional counterparts, it also has
the prerogative to interpret its provisions in the same way that the
Supreme Court interprets or even more narrowly.Y I do not
agree with those who say that a state court is not permitted to
interpret a state provision more narrowly than the United States
Supreme Court interprets a comparable provision. I do not
believe that is correct. Rather, I think it is accurate to say the
states may not enforce narrower rights where to do so would
undermine broader federal constitutional rights; no state has the
authority to do that.' They do have the right to interpret the
state constitution more narrowly. If the Supreme Court were
I Barry Latzer, FourHalf-Truths About State ConstittaionalLow, 65 TaMP.
L. REV. 1123, 1125-30 (1992).
1 To do so would violate the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Article VI, § 2 provides in pertinent part that the "Constitution, and the Law
of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby... ." Id.
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ever to change its mind and reconsider its overly broad
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, as I urged in a recent publication,27 we may reach the day
where some of those rights narrowing state constitutional
interpretations could become enforceable. In any event, for the
purpose of this talk, I have examined only those state court
decisions based on state constitutional law that have adopted the
same position as the Supreme Court, or have broader rights.
As the Table makes clear, the states are really quite closely
divided on some of the issues. Let us examine the good faith
issue again. By my count, ten states currently endorse the Leon
rule as a matter of state constitutional law and ten states, eleven,
if you count New York, have rejected the Leon rule. Whatever
you think of the substance of the good faith issue, it seems fair to
say that New York is not out of the mainstream. However, if you
examine the states that are ruling only on the basis of federal
constitutional law, and if you add them in, then perhaps you
could say New York, along with the other states which reject
Leon on state constitutional grounds, is somewhat out of the
mainstream. If you look at the state courts that have ruled solely
on the state constitutional question, however, New York is in
there with roughly half of the other states that have reached the
question. So it seems to me that one cannot say, based on this
type of division, that New York is out of the mainstream. There
are, however, five decisions where New York is out there by
itself. I will now examine these five New York contrary
decisions. In New York, the effective assistance of counsel
standard is different than the federal standard.28 Whether it is
more rigorous or less demanding than the Strickland test is not
yet clear. But it certainly appears to be different.
27

See Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure:

State Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation,87 J. OF CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 63 (1996).
2 While state law relies on the defendant showing a lack of "meaningful
representation," in People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444
N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981), a defendant alleging a violation under the Federal
Constitution must satisfy the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S.668 (1984).
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Those of you familiar with Miranda law are probably aware
that New York's right to counsel rule is much more rigid than the
federal rule.2 Edwards v. Arizona'? provides that the right to
counsel, once asserted, may be waived at the initiation of the
uncounselled suspect.

3'
By contrast, People v. Cunningham

provides that such waiver is valid only in the presence of counsel.
Protective vehicle searches were approved by the Supreme
Court in the Michigan v. Long32 case. People v. Torres is the
New York Court of Appeals case on this issue.33 It has aroused a
great deal of criticism that I think is justified. New York is
almost by itself in rejecting the position of the United States
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long.
The Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Long that if police
have reason to believe - I do not think they use the term
" Barry Latzer, State Constitutional CriminalLaw, §§ 4:9, 4:11, 5:2.
30 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that "Miranda was not intended to require
that every reference to an attorney, regardless of its ambiguity must be
construed as an invocation of the Miranda rights.").
31 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S. 421 (1980).
32 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, while on patrol in a rural area, two
officers spotted a vehicle that drove into a ditch. Id. at 1035. After receiving
no response to various questions and spotting a knife in the passenger's
compartment of the vehicle, the officers frisked the respondent, who was the
sole occupant of the car. Id. at 1036. One of the officers then spotted a pouch
on the front seat of the vehicle and discovered that the pouch contained
marijuana. Id. After finding nothing as a result of a subsequent search of the
car, the officers impounded the vehicle and opened the trunk, discovering
about seventy five pounds of marijuana. Id. The issue presented here was
whether the officer had the authority to search the passenger compartment. Id.
at 1037. The Court held the officer did have the authority. Id. at 1053.
33 Tones, 74 N.Y.2d at 224, 543 N.E.2d at 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 796. This
case involved an anonymous phone call to the police, which informed them
that a wanted male convicted of homicide could be found at a certain barber
shop. Id. at 226, 543 N.E.2d at 62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 797. After driving to
the location and spotting the defendant enter a car, detectives frisked the two
occupants. Id. In addition, one of the detectives obtained a bag from the front
seat, noticed the shape of a gun, and found weapons in the bag. Id. The issue
here was whether the detective had enough probable cause to search the
interior of defendant's car. Id. at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at
798. The Court held for the defendant. Id.
34463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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"reasonable suspicion" in that case, but most authorities just
translate that as reasonable suspicion --there may be a weapon in
a vehicle, they may conduct a limited search within that vehicle
only in the areas where that weapon may be hidden. 35 Borrowing
from Terry v. Ohio,36 which upheld weapons frisks of pedestrians
on reasonable suspicion, the Court applied the same standard to
vehicle searches for weapons. 37
Now, in the People v. Torres3 case, the New York Court of
Appeals rejected this rule, although when my students press me
to tell them exactly what rule New York has, I have to say I am
quite hard pressed. I think the law in this case is rather unclear.
Here are the facts. The police received a tip that one Popo, who
was wanted for murder, was having his hair cut at a barber shop
on 116" St. and Third Avenue in Manhattan.39 The anonymous
caller described him as a large, six-foot tall Hispanic male,
wearing a white sweater, driving a black El Dorado and carrying
a gun in a shoulder bag. That fact is going to be crucial. Two
detectives went to the barber shop. They saw a man matching
Popo's description. They watched him leave with another man
and they watched him enter a black El Dorado. The detectives
approached with guns drawn, ordered the men out of the car,
frisked them and seized the shoulder bag, which the suspect had
left in the car. After noting its weight and feeling the shape of
the gun from the outside, the detective opened the bag and found
a revolver with live ammunition. The charge was, of course, a
35

Id.at 1049.
The search of the passenger compartment of an automobile,
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant' the officers in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of the weapons.

Id.
'Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
1 Long, 463 U.S. at 1032.
38 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989).
39 Id.
at 226, 543 N.E.2d at 62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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weapons crime.' The Court of Appeals, assuming arguendo that
the tip supported both the order to get out of the vehicle and the
frisk of the men, held that there was no justification for reaching
into the car and removing the bag.41
The court reasoned that under the New York Constitution, an
entry into a vehicle is a significant encroachment into a citizen's
privacy that must be justified at its inception and reasonably
related in scope and propensity to the circumstances which
No legitimate law
rendered the intrusion permissible.42
enforcement concerns justified the intrusion here. The officers
had removed the men from the vehicle and patted them down.43
Any residual fears could have been eliminated by the less
intrusive step of asking them to move away from the car.4 The
scenario in Michigan v. Long, in which upon re-entry into the
vehicle, the suspect could have reached for a concealed weapon
and threatened the police, was dismissed as farfetched.45
It does not strike me as farfetched. Had it been decided on the
basis of Michigan v. Long, the Diaz search would have been
upheld on federal constitutional grounds because surely the police
had reason to believe there was a weapon in this car. After all,
the tipster said Popo would be carrying a black shoulder bag with
a gun. Popo, or Diaz, whatever his real name was, left a black
shoulder bag in the car. So, for the court of appeals to say that
this search violated the New York State Constitution, seems to
me to have opened them up to some serious criticism.

40 Id. at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98. "The defendant
pleaded guilty to third degree criminal possession of a weapon after his motion
to41suppress the physical evidence had been denied." Id.
Id. at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The Court of Appeals
stated: "At most, the detectives may have had a reasonable basis for suspecting
the presence of a gun, however, their information did not rise to the level of
probable cause to search closed containers within the car's passenger
compartment for a weapon." Id.
42 Id. at 229-30, 543 N.E.2d at 65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
43
Id.

44Id.
45

Id. at 230-31, 543 N.E.2d at 65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
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We find that very few courts in the United States have rejected
the Michigan v. Long rule on state constitutional grounds. But
the Diaz court seemed to be eager to announce that it was
rejecting Michigan v. Long. In fact, quite frankly, I would say
that seemed to be the primary motivation for the decision.46
In People v. Diaz,47 New York anticipated the Minnesota v.
Dickerson48 ruling with regard to the issue of plain touch
searches. There is a difference between the Dickerson case and
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Diaz.49 The
difference has to do with whether a police officer can get a good
sense of what he is touching when he touches it. The Supreme
Court apparently thinks that feeling something provides more
information to a police officer than the New York Court of
Appeals believes it provides.5 ° The New York court has
established a per se rule that patting a pocket never justifies a
further intrusion once the officer concludes that the pocket does
not contain a weapon. This is far less flexible then the Supreme
Court's Dickerson rule.
Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The
New York Court of Appeals has "demonstrated its willingness to adopt more
protective standards under the New York State Constitution 'when doing so
best promotes predictability and precision in judicial review of search and
seizure cases and the protection of the individual rights of the citizens of New
York.'" Id.
47 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993). The issue in
this case was "whether the warrantless search of defendant's pocket was
justified by information allegedly obtained by the police in conducting an
authorized protective pat-down. Id. at 107, 612 N.E.2d at 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d
at 941. In this case, officers saw groups meeting on sidewalks, while passing
objects to each other. Id. at 108, 612 N.E.2d at 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
Defendant in this case also abruptly changed direction when he spotted the
officers. Id. One of the officers noticed a bulge in defendant's pocket when
he called defendant over to the car. Id. When one of the officers feared there
was a weapon in defendant's pockets, he grabbed the pocket and felt vials. Id.
The vials turned out to be filled with crack. Id. at 108, 612 N.E.2d at 300,
595 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The court held that the search was unreasonable under
the circumstances and the vials were inadmissible. Id.
46

48

508 U.S. 366 (1993).

49 Diaz,

81 N.Y.2d at 106, 612 N.E.2d at 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
'o Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 366 (1993).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/8

12

1998

Latzer: Criminal Procedure Decisions

CRIMINAL PROCEDUREDECISIONS

Finally, the fifth area would be the Gates rule5 ' respecting
warrants. The Illinois v. Gates 2 case relaxed the requirements
for testing search warrants. Although that ruling came under a
great deal of criticism, nearly half the states have endorsed the
Gates ruling as a matter of state constitutional law, and only five
states, counting New York, have rejected it in some fashion.
What do I conclude from this little survey? My conclusion is
that Governor Pataki is not entirely wrong when he says that the
New York Court of Appeals is out of the mainstream. He can
point to the five cases discussed above - five cases which, as my
analysis shows, enunciate doctrines rejected by most of the other
states. On the other hand, there are ten New York rightsbroadening decisions on issues which have sharply divided the
states, and therefore, the expansion of rights by the Court of
Appeals is hardly unprecedented or unusual. With respect to
these cases, New York is not out of the mainstream. Thus, my
conclusion is that Governor is R
right, which is a nice safe
position to be in after having delivered all of these criticisms.
Thank you so much.

51 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

This case involved

respondents indicted for violation of Iowa drug laws after police officers found
marijuana and other contraband in their residence and vehicle. Id. at 2320.
The police acted pursuant to a warrant. Id. There was a question to the
sufficiency of the affidavit that was submitted to get the warrant. Id. at 2321.
The Court ruled against respondents in abandoning the rigid "two-pronged
test" which analyzes the "informant's reliability" and his "basis for
knowledge."
Id. at 2329. Instead the Court used a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis to reach its holding. Id.
5Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 8

706

[Vol 14

TOURO LAW REVIEW
Issue

NY Case

# of States
adopting
Federal rule

# of States
rejecting
Federal rule

Good faith
exception'

Bigelow2

10

101

61

48

Inevitable

Stit

6

discover
Dog sniff 9

Dunn'°

7"

512

Open fields 3

Scott14

415

416

Gates 17
Searchincident to
2
arrrest '

420

Grirninger 182519
Gokey 2 & Synitl,

1124

42

Seizure defined
26

Bora27

728

1019

VIN search 31

Class3'

132

13

Plain touch'

Diaz35

1236

0

Weapons
search of car

Torres38

539

140

Blasich42

1243

744

(HodariD.)

37

(Long)

Belton4'

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/8

14

1998

Latzer: Criminal Procedure Decisions

CRIMINAL PROCEDUREDECISIONS

Edwards v.
Arizona45

Cunningharnt & Davis4

940

Moran v.
Burbine49

Pinzone

651

8S

Elstad 3

Bethea'

355

3

New York v.
HarrisY

Hanis5s

V9

160

Effective
assistance of

El!is

3463

36

counsel61

IUnited States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that exclusionary rule
not2 applicable when police rely on warrant subsequently ruled invalid).
People v. Bigelow 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630
(1985) (declining on state constitutional grounds to apply a good faith
exception where a search warrant was defective whether measured by the
Aguilar-Spineli or the Gates standard). "[I] f the People are permitted to use
the seized evidence, the exclusionary rule's purpose is completely frustrated, a
premium is placed on the illegal police action and a positive incentive is
provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future." Id. at 427.
3Jackson v. Arkansas, 722 S.W.2d 831 (1987) (relying on rules of criminal
procedure); Johnson v. Florida, 660 So. 2d 648 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1550 (1996); Lloyd v. Indiana, 677 N.E.2d 71 (1997); Crayton v.
Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 165
(1993); Louisiana v. Wood, 457 So.2d 206 (1984); Missouri v. Sweeney, 701
S.W.2d 420 (1985); Ohio v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986) (not clearly
relying on the state constitution); South Dakota v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825
(1988); Janis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 649, 652 (Va. 1996) (stating that
"no justification exists for drawing a distinction between the two constitutional
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provisions--federal and state--for purposes of good faith analysis."); Hyde v.
Wyoming, 769 P.2d 376 (1989).
4
Connecticut v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (1990); Idaho v. Guzman, 842 P2d
660 (1992); People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996) (declining on state
constitutional grounds to apply the good-faith exception established in Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich.
1986); New Jersey v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (1987); New Mexico v.
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993); North Carolina v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553
(1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); Vermont v.
Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (1991); Washington v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 (1991).
5Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that body of murder victim
not suppressed despite illegally obtained admission about its location where the
state showed that a search of the area would have occurred anyway).
6
People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201
(1987) (unlike the federal rule, the New York constitutional inevitable
discovery rule is inapplicable to "primary evidence").
7Connecticut v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1326 (1993); New Hampshire v.
Beede, 406 A.2d 125 (1979); North Carolina v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502
(1992); Ohio v. Wilson, 646 N.E.2d 863, 865 (1994) (per curiam);
Pennsylvania v. Rood, 686 A.2d 442 (1996); Washington v. Richman, 933
P.2d 1088 (1997).
8
Arizona v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545 (1986); Hawaii v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889
(1995); Massachessetts v. O'Connor (1989); New Jersey v. Sugar (1985)
(reliance on state constitutional law unclear).
I United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that exposure of
luggage to a dog trained as a drug-detector is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
1
People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388
(1990) (use of dogs in an apartment hallway is a search under the state
constitution, valid only where police have reasonable suspicion).
" People v. Mayberry, 644 P.2d 810 (Cal. 1982); Keefe v. Georgia, 376
S.E.2d 406 (1988); Hawaii v Snitkin, (1984); Kansas v. McMillin, 927 P.2d
949 (1996); Louisiana v. Senegal, 664 So. 2d 832 (1995) (reliance on the state
constitution is unclear); Oregon v. Slowikowski, 761 P.2d 1315 (1988);
Washington v. Boyce, 723 P.2d 28 (1986).
'2 McGahan v Alaska, 807 P.2d 506 (1991); Colorado v. Boylan, 854 P.2d
807 (1993); Connecticut v. Torres, 645 A.2d 529 (1994); New Hampshire v.
Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (1987).
" Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that police officers
may enter and search privately owned land outside the curtilage of a home
without a warrant).
"'People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1992) (holding that fencing or posting of private property established a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the state constitution).
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15Id.
16 Hawaii v. Barnett, 703 P.2d 680 (1985); Montana v. Bullock, 901 P.2d
61 (1995); Oregon v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015 (1988); Vermont v. Kirchoff,
58717A.2d 988 (1991).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.213 (1983) (substituting the totality-of-thecircumstances test for the Aguliar-Spinelli, two pronged test for determining
the validity of a warrant).
t8
People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55
(1988) (rejecting on state constitutional grounds the totality-of-thecircumstances test for warrants).
11 People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (1986); Connecticut v. Barton,
(1991); Florida v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123 (1995); Idaho v. Lang (1983);
People v Tisler, (11. 1984); Iowa v. Bousman, 387 N.W.2d 605 (1986);
Kansas v. Rose, 665 P.2d 1111 (1983); Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665
S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1984); Maine v. Marquis, 525 A.2d 1041 (1987); Potts v.
Maryland (1984); McCommon v. Missisisippi, 467 So.2d 940 (1985);
Missouri v. Woodworth, 941 S.W.2d 679 (1997); Montana v. Sundberg
(1988); New Hampshire v. Carroll, 645 A.2d 82 (1988); New Jersey v.
Novembrino (1987); North Carolina v. Arrington (1984); North Dakota v.
Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207 (1988); Langham v. Oklahoma, 787 P.2d 1279
(1990); Rhode Island v. King, 693 A.2d 658 (1997); Bower v. Texas, 769
SW2d 887 (1989); Utah v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (1997); West Virginia v.
Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (1986); Wisconsin v. Anderson, 406 N.W.2d 398
(1987); Bonsness v. Wyoming, 672 P2d 1291 (1983).
1 Alaska v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (1985); Massachessetts v. Upton, 476
N.E.2d 548 (1985); Tennessee v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (1989);
Washington v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
21 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a search
incident to a custodial arrest requires no additional justification).
I People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618

(1983).
1 People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896
(1983) (search-incident to arrest held invalid absent exigent circumstances).
24 People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941 (11. 1984); Maine v. Paris, 343 A.2d
588 (1975); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 (1996); Shell v.
Mississippi, 554 So.2d 887 (1989); Montana v. Jellison,769 P.2d 711 (1989);
Nebraska v. Brooks, 560 N.W.2d 180 (1997); New Hampshire v. Farnsworth,
497 A.2d 835 (1985); Tennessee v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949 (1996); Rogers
v. Texas, 774 S.W.2d 247 (1989); Utah v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (1976);
Roose v. Wyoming, 759 P.2d 478 (1985).
1 Zehrung v. Alaska, 569 P.2d 189 (1987); Hawaii v. Barrett, 701 P.2d
1277 (1985); Massachussetts v. Madera, 521 N.E.2d 738 (1985); Oregon v.
Caraher, 653 P.2d 942 (1982).
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California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (holding that there is no
seizure unless the citizen actually submits to police show of authority, or there
is an application of physical force).
27 People v. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d 531, 634 N.E.2d 168, 611 N.Y.S.2d 796
(1994) (holding that test for seizure is whether a reasonable person would have
believed, under the circumstances, that the officer's conduct was a significant
limitation on his freedom).
I Perez v. Florida, 620 So. 2d 1256 (1993); Idaho v. Agundis, 903 P.2d
752 (1995); Henderson v. Maryland, 597 A.2d 486 (1991); Nebraska v.
Cronin, 509 N.W.2d 673 (1993); Oregon v. Holmes, 813 P.2d 28 (1991);
Johnson v. Texas, 912 S.W.2d 227 (1995); Washington v. Young, 935 P.2d
1372 (1997).
29 Rogers-Dwight v. Alaska, 899 P.2d 1389 (1995); People v. Hill, 929
P.2d 735 (Colo. 1996); Connecticut v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992);
Hawaii v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (1992); Louisiana v. Tucker, 626 So.2d 707
(1993); Massachussetts v. Thinh Van Cao, 644 N.E.2d 1294 (1995); In re
E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993); New Hampshire v. Quezada, 681
A.2d 79 (1996); New Jersey v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (1994); Pennsylvania v.
Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (1996)
1o New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (holding that warrantless entry
into a lawfully stopped automobile to observe the Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN) on the dashboard does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
1, People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313
(1986) (reinstating on state constitutional grounds the judgment rendered in
People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009 (1984), rev'd, New York v. Class, 475
U.S. 106 (1976).
26

32

Id.

Utah v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990).
U
3 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (holding that officer may
make warrantless seizure of nonthreatening contraband where, during lawful
pat down, its identity is immediately apparent).
31 People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1993) (holding that once the patting officer determines that a pocket contains
no weapon, the New York constitutional Terry rule will support no further
searching).
36 People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014 (1995); C.D.T. v. Indiana, 653
N.E.2d 1041 (1995); Kansas v. Wonders, 929 P.2d 792 (1996); Kentucky v.
Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649 (1994); Lousiana v. Denis, 691 So.2d 1295 (1997);
Michigan v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 (1996), cert. denied, Minnesota v.
Burton, 556 N.W.2d 600 (1996); Missouri v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30 (1996);
New Jersey v. Jackson, 648 A.2d 738 (1994); Pennsylvania v. Dorsey, 654
A.2d 1086 (1995); South Dakota v. Tilton, 561 N.W.2d 660 (1997); Heiman
v. Texas, 923 S.W.2d 622 (1995).
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Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that search of
automobile passenger compartment upheld where the officers have a
reasonable belief that the occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
control of weapons, and the search is limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden).
" People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796
(1989) (entry into vehicle to remove a bag believed to contain a weapon not
justified where, under the circumstances, the officers were not threatened).
" Connecticut v. Wilkins, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997); Florida v. Dilyerd, 467
So.2d 301 (1985); Massachussetts v. Moses., 557 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. 1990);
Ohio v. Jackson, 673 N.E.2d 685 (1996); Washington v. Kennedy, 726 P.2d
445 (1986).
o Oregon v. Bates, 747 P2d 991 (1987).
41 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that incident to the
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile police may search the
passenger compartment of that automobile and the contents of any containers
found therein).
41 People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y. 2d 673, 541 N.E.2d 40, 543 N.Y.S. 40
(1989) (contrary to the Federal Constitution, a search of a vehicle incident to
the arrest of an occupant is not justified by the mere fact of arrest, but only by
the arrest plus the presence of exigent circumstances).
43 Stout v. Arkansas, 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995); People v. McMillon, 892
P.2d 879 (Colo. 1995); Connecticut v. Waller, 612 A.2d 1189 (1992); Iowa v.
Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534 (1981); People v. Ragland, 385 N.W.2d 772
(1986); Missouri v. Darrington, 896 S.W.2d 727 (1995); North Dakota v.
Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849 (1989); South Dakota v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128
(1982); Osban v. Texas, 726 S.W.2d 107 (1986); Utah ex rel. K.K.C., 636
P.2d 1044 (1981) (not clearly relying on the state constitution); West Virginia
v. Flint, 301 S.E.2d 765 (1983); Wisconsin v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).
"Hawaii v. Ritte, 710 P.2d 1197 (1985); Idaho v. Charpentier, 1997 WL
526023 (1997); Lousiana v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381 (1982); Nevada v.
Greenwald, 858 P.2d 36 (1993); New Hampshire v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409
(1995); Ohio v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992); Washington v. Stroud, 720
P.2d 436 (1986).
41 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (once the custodial suspect
asserts the right to counsel for the purpose of dealing with police interrogation,
a resumption of questioning is prohibited unless counsel is provided, or the
accused himself initiates further communication with the police).
4 People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d
421 (1980) (holding that once the custodial suspect asserts the right to counsel
reinterrogation is prohibited absent a waiver in the presence of counsel).
I People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460
(1990) (holding that if a suspect asserts the right to counsel in a noncustodial

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 8

712

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

setting he may subsequently waive the right without the presence of an
attorney).
48 People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1990); Traylor v. Florida, 596
So.2d 957 (1992); People v. Fayne, 669 N.E.2d 1172 (Ill. App. 1996);
Lousiana v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019 (1982); Missouri v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d
98 (1992); New Hampshire v. Grant-Chase, 665 A.2d 380 (1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1431 (1996); Oregon v. Kell, 734 P.2d 334 (1987); West
Virginia v. Sowards, 280 S.E.2d 721 (1981) (per curiam); Wells v. Wyoming,
846 P.2d 589 (1992).
49 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1996) (holding that where police did
not tell custodial suspect that an attorney hired by his sister was trying to
contact him, his waiver and confession were proper, as there is no federal
constitutional requirement that police inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts
to reach him).
50 People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 377 N.E.2d 721, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1978) (holding that suspect's family may retain lawyer on his behalf and
waiver of counsel is invalid unless made in the presence of counsel).
"' Arizona v. Transon, 924 P.2d 486 (1996); People v. Page, 907 P.2d 624
(Colo. 1995), cert. denied, Colo. LEXIS 823 (1995); Lodowski v. Maryland,
513 A.2d 299 (1986); Terrell v. State, 891 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1994);
Washington v. Earls, 805 P.2d 211 (1991); Wisconsin v. Hanson, 401
N.W.2d 771 (1987).
52 Connecticut v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (1988); Bryan v. Delaware, 571
A.2d 170 (1990); Haliburton v. Florida, 514 So.2d 1088 (1987); People v.
McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (I11. 1994); Lousiana v. Matthews, 408 So.2d
1274 (1982); People v. Bender, 551 N.W.2d 71 (Mich. 1996); New Jersey v.
Reed, 627 A.2d 630 (1992) (relying on common law and statute); Lewis v.
Oklahoma, 695 P.2d 528 (1984).
" Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that voluntary unwarned
statement, though inadmissible under Miranda, does not taint second statement
obtained after warnings and waiver).
I People v. Bethea, 67 N.Y.2d 364, 493 N.E.2d 937, 502 N.Y.S.2d 713
(1986) (per curian) (unwarned statement taints second warned statement where
latter is part of a continuous chain of events).
" People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d 117 (1997); New Hampshire v. Aubuchont,
679 A.2d 1147 (1996); Oregon v. Elstad, 717 P.2d 174 (1986).
56 Arizona v. Carrillo, 750 P.2d 883 (1988) (dictum; not clearly relying on
state constitution); Massachussettsv. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (1992 )(state
common law); Tennessee v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (1992).
17 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that a Payton violation
(warrantless home entry to arrest) does not taint a subsequent stationhouse
confession where it was not the product of being in unlawful custody).
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" People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1991) (on remand, rejecting the federal rule on the basis of the state
constitution).
59 Michigan v. Dowdy, 536 N.W.2d 794 (1995).
60 Connecticut v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).
61
Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial).
I People v. Ellis, 81 N.Y.2d 854, 613 N.E.2d 529, 597 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1993) (impossible to formulate a litmus test for ineffective legal
representation; attorney must provide "meaningful representation.").
I People v. Rowland, 841 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1992); Davis v. People, 871 P.2d
769 (Colo. 1994); Aillon v. Meachum, 559 A.2d 206 (Con. 1989); White v.
Georgia, 455 S.E.2d 117 (1995); Idaho v. Youngblood, 786 P.2d 1127
(1990); Illinois v. Newbern, 659 N.E.2d 6 (1995); Richardson v. Indiana, 476
N.E.2d 497 (1985); Iowa v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735 (1995); Baker v.
Kansas,755 P2d 493 (1988); McQueen v. Kentucky, 721 S.W.2d 694 (1986);
Lousiana v. Berry, 430 So.2d 1005 (1983); Harris v. Maryland, 496 A.2d
1074 (1985); Michigan v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797 (1994); Wiley v.
Mississippi, 517 So.2d 1373 (1987); Montana v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 771
(1986); Nebraska v. Nearhood, 448 N.W.2d 399 (1989); New Hampshire v.
Fennell, 578 A.2d 329 (1990); New Jersey v. Fritz, 519 A.2d 336 (1987);
New Mexico v. Hernandez, 846 P.2d 312 (1993); North Carolina v. Braswell,
324 S.E.2d 241 (1985); Woehlhoff v. North Dakota, 487 N.W.2d 16 (1992);
Ohio v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373, 379 (1989) (not clearly relying on the state
constitution); Moen v. Peterson, 824 P.2d 404 (Or. 1992); Pennsylvania v.
Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (1987); Rhode Island v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842 (1993);
Jones v South Dakota, 353 N.W.2d 781 (1984); Davis v. Tennessee, 912
S.W.2d 689 (1995); Boyd v. Texas, 811 S.W.2d 105 (1991); Utah v. Lairby,
699 P.2d 1187 (1984); In re Bruyette, 556 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1988); Washington
v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (1995); West Virginia v. Wood, 460 S.E.2d 771
(1995); Wisconsin v. Sanchez, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996); Campbell v.
Wyoming, 728 P.2d 628 (1986).
1 Hawaii v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298 (1992); Tribou v. Maine, 552 A.2d
1262 (1989); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 546 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1989).
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